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for all x, which yields the equilibrium land rent schedule R(x) = ξ(H/2 À |x|). The aggregate land rent is thus given by ALR ¼
When ALR is equally re-distributed to all agents, equilibrium total urban costs are given by
Letting h ≡ ξ/4 > 0 then yields the expression hH for urban costs.
C.2. Consumer Surplus
Denote by D R V dðmÞdm the demand for all varieties of the differentiated good supplied in the city. As can be seen from (1), marginal utility at zero consumption is bounded for each variety. Hence, consumers need not have positive demand for all of them. The inverse demand for each variety m of that good is obtained by maximising (1) subject to (2) and can be expressed as follows:
pðmÞ ¼ a À cdðmÞ À gD (C.1) whenever d(m) ≥ 0. Expression (C.1) can be inverted to yield a linear demand system as follows:
where p ð1=N Þ R V pðmÞdm stands for the average price. By definition, V is the set of varieties satisfying
For any given value of love for variety c, lower average prices p or a larger number of competing varieties N increase the price elasticity of demand and decrease the price bound p d defined in (C.3). Stated differently, a lower p or a larger N generate a 'tougher' competitive environment, thereby reducing the maximum price at which entrepreneurs still face positive demand. Letting p hl (m) stand for the price of variety m produced in h and sold in l, and V hl be the set of varieties produced in h and consumed in l, the consumer surplus is given by:
The expression with a single city is obtained by letting V hl ¼ V, p hl = p, N l = N and by eliminating the sum across h.
C.3. Price Equilibrium
Let p hl (c) = [p hl (c) À s hl c]q hl (c) denote operating profits, expressed as a function of the entrepreneur's inverse productivity c. The firms set prices to maximise these profits for each market separately. Then, the profit-maximising prices and output levels must satisfy (for h 6 ¼ l, with s hl = 1 substituted for when h = l): Integrating the prices in (C.5) over all available varieties, summing across regions and re-arranging yields the average delivered price in market l as follows:
c dGðcÞ stands for the average delivered cost of surviving firms selling to l. Substituting (C.6) into (C.5), some straightforward re-arrangements show that the equilibrium prices can then be expressed as follows:
denotes the domestic cost cut-off in region l. Only entrepreneurs with c 'sufficiently smaller' than c l are productive enough to sell in city l. This can be seen by expressing q hl in (C.5) more compactly as follows:
Clearly, selling in a 'foreign' market l when producing in h requires that c ≤ c l /s hl , whereas the analogous condition for selling in the 'domestic' market is given by c ≤ c l . In what follows, we denote by c hl the export cost cut-off for firms producing in region h and selling to region l. This cut-off must satisfy the zero-profit cut-off condition c hl ¼ supfcjp hl ðcÞ [ 0g. From (3) and (C.7), this condition can be expressed as either p hl (c hl ) = s hl c hl or q hl (c hl ) = 0, which then yields: c hl ¼ c l =s hl . Clearly, c hl ≤ c l as s hl ≥ 1. Put differently, trade barriers make it harder for exporters to break-even relative to their local competitors because of higher market access costs. As p d l ¼ p ll ðc l Þ ¼ c l , the zero-profit cut-off condition (C.3) can be expressed as follows:
We can thus solve for the mass of entrepreneurs selling in region l as follows:
Using the Pareto parameterisation of subsection 3.3, the average price and the average marginal cost in region l are computed as follows:
, that is they are both proportional to the domestic cut-off. Using this expression, as well as (C.8), we can then express the mass of sellers in l as follows:
where the first equality comes from the definition of N l . The consumer surplus is finally derived by substituting the equilibrium prices into (C.4) given in Appendix C.2.
C.4. Expected Profits and Sales
The expected profit in region l in the symmetric case under the Pareto parameterisation is given as follows:
Using this expression and noting that neither the consumer surplus nor the urban costs depend on the entrepreneur's ability, we readily obtain (9). By the same token, the per capita sales (R for 'revenue') are
Appendix D. Types of Equilibria
This Appendix characterises under what conditions which type of equilibrium emerges. Although we restrict ourselves to the case where f E > 0 in the main text, we also discuss the limit case where f E = 0 in this Appendix.
PROPOSITION 6.
(i) The rural equilibrium exists and is stable for any f E > 0.
then the rural equilibrium is the unique spatial equilibrium.
the rural equilibrium exists and is a stable spatial equilibrium if and only if
Proof. (i ) Condition (7) implies that H * = 0 if and only if c Ã 1 ¼ a. Substituting this result into (10) shows that this inequality holds for any f E > 0. Local stability of the rural equilibrium then immediately follows from the strict inequality. It is useful to show (iii) next. If f E = 0, local stability of the rural equilibrium requires that @f /@c 1 > 0 when evaluated at fH Ã ; c Ã 1 g ¼ f0; ag. Using (10), some straightforward computations show that this is equivalent to h > h R , where h R is defined in (D.1). This establishes the stability of the rural equilibrium. To show its existence and to derive a sufficient condition for it to be the only equilibrium, add and subtract (D.1) in (7) to obtain:
where the inequality stems from c 1 < a. Imposing h ≥ h R , we further have
where the first inequality in (D.3) is due to c 1 < a and where the second inequality comes from h ≥ h R . Consequently, when the right-hand side of (D.3) is (weakly) negative, then f (c 1 ;Á) < 0 for all values of c 1 . In that case, the rural equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. A sufficient condition for this to be so is f E ≥ f R , where f R ða 2 =2gÞðk À 1Þ=ðk þ 2Þ. This establishes the result.
, then there exists a stable urban equilibrium.
Proof.
(i) Let f E ≥ f R and h ≥ h R ; then the rural equilibrium H Ã = 0 is the unique equilibrium. (ii) Let f E = 0 and h > h R ; then H Ã = 0 is the unique stable equilibrium. (iii) Let f E = 0 and h ∈ (0,h R ); then there exists a unique pair fH Ã ; c Ã 1 g in R þþ Â ð0; aÞ that constitutes a stable equilibrium (the urban equilibrium).
Parts (i) and (ii) are a re-statement of Proposition 6. (iii) We are looking for a candidate equilibrium with a > c 1 . In this case, (10) is equivalent to
the right-hand side of which is strictly concave in c 1 , increasing at the limit c 1 ?0, and its maximum value on (0,a] is given by 3a k+2 /(k + 2). Therefore, the condition h < h R is also sufficient to ensure that there exists a pair fH Ã ; c (7) that is compatible with an equilibrium. We finally invoke the continuity of f (Á) to establish (iv): at the limit f E ?0, there exists a finite h U ( f E ) by (ii) such that a stable urban equilibrium exists, with
is continuously differentiable in both f E and h, it must be the case that h U ( f E ) is positive in the neighbourhood of f E = 0 and, by @f /@f E < 0 and @f /@h < 0, that
, then (D.4) holds with a strict inequality for any c 1 ∈ [0,a] and no urban equilibrium exists as a result.
To extend the foregoing proof to the multi-city case of Section 5, it suffices to replace h R by h R U and A by (1 + Φ)A in the proof above.
Appendix E. Theoretical Extensions

E.1. Return Migration and Inequality
Assume that, upon learning their inverse ability c, entrepreneurs who fail to be successful may return to the countryside at no cost. Assume further that all agents know this piece of information and include it in their entry decision. Starting from the equilibrium conditions of the benchmark model, the mass of people staying in the city is now G(c 1 )H with G(c 1 ) = (c 1 /c max ) k . LetÃ 1=½2ðk þ 1Þc. The market-clearing condition, which characterises the mass of varieties actually supplied to consumers, may be re-written as:
Next, the profit is given by PðcÞ ¼ Gðc 1 ÞH =4cðc 1 À cÞ 2 , so that the average profits of the stayers may be written asP
Note that (E.1) is positive and concave, as well as decreasing in c 1 over (a/2,a). Furthermore, it is readily verified that
so that the share of profits accruing to entrepreneurs with a draw smaller than q is given by
which depends on the inverse average productivity c 1 . For any given q, the income share is larger in larger cities (smaller c 1 ). The Gini coefficient can then finally be computed as follows:
which is independent of city size and solely depends on the distributional parameter k ≥ 1, despite the fact that r(q) is a function of c 1 . Thus, the model with return migration delivers the counterfactual prediction that city size does not matter for income inequality.
E.2. Costly Access to Urban Diversity in the Countryside
Assume, contrary to what we did in the main body of the study, that each region l has its own countryside (and not a 'common pool'). Consumers in the countryside associated with city l, henceforth denoted by l 0 , can access all goods that are available in the city but at a higher cost. More precisely, if residents in city l can access goods from city h at trade cost s hl , rural residents have to pay s hl0 ¼ ns hl , with ξ > 1. We assume that ξ is common to all countrysides but this assumption is immaterial for our analysis and we could easily relax it. Let us subscript all expressions for the countryside l 0 by 0. It can readily be verified using Appendices C.2 and C.3 that all expressions remain basically unchanged. In particular, the consumer surplus in the countryside is given by:
The number of sellers in countryside l 0 must satisfy
where A 0 = ξ Àk A < A. The indirect utility differential between remaining in the countryside or moving to city l, given by
is obviously always smaller than when access to urban goods is prohibitive in the countryside. When urban goods are available in the countryside, cities will grow less strongly as the urban consumption premium decreases. This is one explanation of urban giants in the Third World -access to all sorts of goods and services that are just inexistent outside of cities.
Let c l0 c 0 for simplicity. In the case of a single city, the free-entry condition reduces to
with the complementary slackness condition Hf(H,c 1 ,c 0 ) = 0. The first term (expected profits) is strictly increasing with H as access to urban consumers increases entrepreneurs' profits. The second term is always positive but less so the smaller is ξ (in the limit, when c 0 ?a, it boils down to the corresponding expression in the main body of the study; or it vanishes if ξ = 1, in which case only the profits/urban costs trade-off matters). Turning to Condition (E.4), it can be solved for H as follows in the countryside:
and for H as follows in the city:
The foregoing Conditions (E.7) and (E.8) reveal that c 0 > c 1 for all ξ > 1, that is the consumer surplus is lower in the countryside. Clearly, c 0 can be expressed as a function of the city cut-off, c 0 = f (c 1 ). We thus have
which we need to examine -combined with (E.8) -to determine the cut-offs c 1 and the city size H. The remaining variables (rural population and rural cut-off) can then be readily retrieved.
Let us look at the equilibrium structure numerically. A preliminary investigation confirms a few results. First, as shown above, c 0 > c 1 (which is obvious). Second, the structure of equilibria seems to be the same as the one in the main body of the study. There is always a rural equilibrium (obvious) and at most one stable urban equilibrium. We can depict an example as follows in the two panels of Figure E1 . The dashed curve is the locus of (c 1 ,c 0 ) such that f (H,c 1 , c 0 ) = 0, where we have replaced H by its expression in (E.8). All points below that curve (to the south-west) are such that f < 0, whereas all points above that curve (to the north-east) are such that f > 0. The solid curve depicts the locus of (c 1 ,c 0 ) that satisfies (E.7) and (E.8). Clearly, that locus lie above the 45 degree line for all admissible couples (i.e. such that c 1 ≤ a and c 0 ≤ a). Actually, in the example below, a = 10 and the solid bold locus must cut the 45 degree line at c 1 = a and c 0 = a. Below those values, it is always above the 45 degree line, that is c 0 > c 1 as it must be.
In the left panel of Figure E1 , there is only a rural equilibrium. This is easy to see as the bold locus lies always in the zone where f < 0. In words, for all values of c 1 < a and c 0 < a, people want to stay in the countryside. Hence, the equilibrium is such that f (a,a) < 0 and H = 0 (with L people remaining in the countryside). The left panel of Figure E1 is drawn for a high value of the fixed entry costs f E = 100.
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Now keep all parameters unchanged and decrease the fixed entry costs f E to 10. In that case, as can be seen from the right panel of Figure E1 , the dashed locus shifts down, whereas the solid locus remains the same. We now have an intersection between the two loci, that is a point where f = 0 and (E.7) and (E.8) hold. At that point, c 1 and c 0 are such that agents are indifferent at the margin between staying in the countryside or being in the city. Moving up the solid locus raises c 1 (thus shrinking the city) and yields f > 0: hence, if people would leave the city, they would be willing to move back. Moving down the locus decreases c 1 (thus making the city bigger) and yields f < 0: hence, if people would enter the city, they would be worse off and willing to move back. The intersection between the solid and the dashed locus thus yields the unique stable urban equilibrium. The rural equilibrium at (a, a) is obviously unstable. Observe that decreasing f E shifts down the dashed locus, which corresponds to smaller values of c 1 and c 0 and, therefore, larger equilibrium city sizes H l .
Appendix F. Data for Empirics and Numerical Illustrations
Our data on MSA sizes, average hourly wages, mean wages by income quintiles, aggregate rent and income inequality come from the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2007. The data on employment come from the BLS, whereas metropolitan GDP comes from the BEA. The geographical data come from the 2000 US Census Gazetteer county geography file. We aggregate up to the MSA level using the county-to-MSA concordance tables for 2007. The geographical coordinates of an MSA are county-population weighted average centroids of the counties in the MSA. The MSA surface area -land surface only -is obtained from the same data source as the sum across constituent counties.
Following Corcos et al. (2012) and Behrens et al. (2012) and using the properties of the Pareto distribution, the cut-offs are computed as follows:
where gdpc l is GDP per employee in MSA l. Following Redding and Venables (2004) , internal trade costs in a city are approximated by: : (i) We back out the unobservable A l terms from the identity (7) as follows:
(ii) Using the values ofÂ l , we compute the corresponding upper bounds:
Observe that as there are trade costs within each city, the 'domestic cut-off' is not given by c l , but by c l /s ll . We make sure in the application that c l =s ll \ĉ l;max for all l.
(iii) We then use the free-entry conditions to get the unobservableĥ l terms:
We make sure in the application thatĥ l is positive for all l.
(iv) Finally, we can run numerical illustrations. To this end, we proceed as follows. First, we either reduce d -the distance elasticity of trade costs -by 10%, or increase it by 5%, or we reduce the distance d hl between New York and Chicago by 50%. Then, for each case we solve the system of 2 × K equations given by (F.1) and (F.3) for the 2 × K unknowns H h and c h that would be observed in the new equilibrium. The upper bounds,ĉ l ;max , the commuting costs,ĥ l , and the parameters (a,g,c,k,f E ) are all held constant in those exercises.
We compute the Gini index for all cities as follows. Take an arbitrary city '. Define the accessibility of destination cities from ' as c j /s 'j , rank destination cities from the most accessible to the least accessible (assuming ties away without loss of generality so as to simplify notation) and drop the origin subscript ' from s 'h (where h is the destination city) for simplicity so that with N = 356 in our case. Obviously, if firm c is more productive than firm z, then c serves at least as many markets as z. We then consider N + 1 = 357 firm categories, with firms in category n serving n markets, n ∈ {0,…,N}.
The aggregate earnings of all categories taken together are equal to By this logic, it follows that the aggregate earnings of firms serving Markets 1 to n (i.e. the earnings of firms serving the n most accessible markets) are equal to
